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I. INTRODUCTION
This Symposium identifies several areas of state wealth transfer
law that intersect or conflict with federal law. 2 These intersections and
conflicts represent a new frontier because, historically, the field of
wealth transfer law was governed almost entirely by the states, with

*
Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Judge Norma L. Shapiro Scholar, Rutgers School of
Law-Newark. This Comment was prepared in connection with the Vanderbilt Law Review
Symposium on "The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer" (February 21, 2014,
Nashville, Tennessee). Funding for this Symposium was generously provided by the ACTECo
Foundation. The author is grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Gary Francione, George
Thomas, and Stephen Urice.
1.
Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871 (2014).
2.
For a survey of intersections of federal law and state inheritance law, see Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1661
(2014) (arguing that, in most areas where federal law disrupts state inheritance law rules, the
results are unfavorable).
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little to no interference by the federal system. Because the Supremacy
Clause mandates that federal law prevail over conflicting state law, the
absence of a comprehensive body of federal wealth transfer law creates
a complex and unpredictable vacuum in cases implicating preemption.
The contributions of this Symposium, therefore, articulate a compelling
need for Congress, federal courts, and federal agencies to establish
guiding principles for the development and interpretation of federal
wealth transfer rules, which in some settings may benefit from the
adoption of state law. These guiding principles are necessary to
facilitate a just evaluation of the competing interests at stake,
particularly when a federal interest requires that state wealth transfer
law be displaced. 3 In adopting such principles, federal law need not
always defer to state law, but the long history of the states' experience
in this field may provide valuable information from which the federal
system may greatly benefit.
This Comment identifies a central tenet of wealth transfer law
that should guide federal actors when operating in this area: Wealth
transfer law facilitates donative intent by responding to circumstances
unanticipated by the donor. Wealth transfer law performs this intentfulfilling function by supplying opt-outs, presumptions, and default
rules to solve problems created by the donor's inability to predict or
respond to future events. To illustrate that principle, this Comment will
focus on one such rule, disclaimer rights, which refer to a donee's refusal
to accept a donative transfer. In "Disclaimers and Federalism," 4
Professor Adam J. Hirsch identifies several settings in which federal
law improperly displaces or applies state law disclaimer rights. This
Comment argues that many of the conflicts identified by Professor
Hirsch could be transparently and fairly evaluated by considering
principles of donative intent and unanticipated circumstances.
II. PRINCIPLES OF DONATIVE INTENT AND
UNANTICIPATED CIRCUMSTANCES

The core function of wealth transfer law is to facilitate the
donor's freedom of disposition, subject to the few restrictions necessary
to protect certain parties, such as the decedent's surviving spouse,
3.

In 2013, the Uniform Law Commission approved a set of general principles to guide the

treatment of state law at the federal level. UNIF. LAW COMM'N, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM

(2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/federalism%/ 20and%/20state%/2Olaw/
2013augFederalism%20Principles.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZK3J-KD6F.
4.
Hirsch, supra note 1 (arguing that the term "federal disclaimer law" is a shorthand
reference to the treatment of state law disclaimer rights at the federal level, not a body of federal
statutes or common law governing disclaimer).
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among others. 5 Implementing the donor's intent, however, presents
challenges when the donative instrument fails to anticipate material
future events that, when viewed in hindsight, might have caused the
donor to reconsider her estate plan. This theme features prominently in
the wealth transfer setting because donors often fail or forget to make
necessary revisions upon the happening of estate-altering events.
Omissions of this sort include lack of planning for the beneficiary's
insolvency or disability and the failure to update a donative instrument
following divorce or the birth or death of a child. In many cases, the
problem becomes evident only after the donor's death. The passage of
time between the donor's execution of a wealth transfer instrument and
the actual transfer of property pursuant to that instrument increases
the likelihood that an unanticipated change of circumstance will
frustrate the donor's intent.
Professor
Hirsch,
in
discussing
this
"testamentary
obsolescence," has observed that "[w]henever a court is called upon to
apply the performative words of others, it must decide whether to read
those words statically or dynamically, in spite of or in light of evolving
facts." 6 Many areas of wealth transfer law seek to implement donative
intent by applying rule-based presumptions about what a typical donor
would have done with full and timely knowledge of the unanticipated
circumstance. Professor Hirsch argues, persuasively, that when default
rules of will interpretation mirror commonly held donative preferences,
the law minimizes error by applying presumptions about probable
intent that most closely approximate actual intent.7 The same is true
for default rules of wealth transfer outside the context of wills. 8
It is important to understand why inheritance law responds to
evolving facts unanticipated by the donor-it does so to protect the
donor's freedom of disposition, not the beneficiary's interest in receiving
a gift. 9 In contrast to European civil law inheritance rules mandating
5.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 10.1

cmt. a (2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of
disposition ... the donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.").
6.
Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 609, 611 (2009) (presenting a comprehensive theoretical framework for addressing the
problem of testamentary obsolescence).
7.
See generally id. (proposing a cost-minimizing default rule for the judicial handling of
testamentary obsolescence).
8.
See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2004) (arguing for the increased use of default rules in
inheritance law given their established success in contract law).
9.
Hirsch, supra note 6, at 632 ("[C]ourts defend the doctrine of implied revocation as
anticipat[ing] that, upon undergoing a fundamental change in family composition ... [testators]
would most likely intend to provide for their new family members, and/or revoke prior provisions
made for their ex-spouses.' " (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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forced succession from one generation to the next, American inheritance
and property succession law is almost exclusively organized around the
power to transmit property, not the right to receive a gift or
inheritance. 10 Although a transferee may benefit from rules
implementing the donor's probable intent in light of changed
circumstances, such benefit is collateral to the donor-centric function of
those rules.
Consider, for example, the following illustration of a wealth
transfer rule that implements donative intent by accounting for
circumstances unanticipated by the donor: Suppose that thirty years
after a testator executed her will, one of the beneficiaries-the testator's
sister-died, but news of the death never reached the testator, who later
died without updating her will. Who should receive the predeceased
sister's share? The predeceased sister's own children; the predeceased
sister's surviving spouse; or the testator's residuary beneficiary, her
local synagogue? State antilapse rules account for this change of
circumstance (a predeceased beneficiary who was a close blood relative)
by allowing the sister's children to inherit the devise because that is
probably what the testator would have wanted had she known about
her sister's death." This application of the antilapse rule confers a
benefit on the predeceased sister's children, but not because those
children are any more entitled or deserving than the sister's surviving
spouse or the testator's synagogue. The sister's children inherit because
the law assumes that most testators would want a lapsed devise to
descend to that predeceased relative's own issue.
From a broader perspective, the antilapse rule is but one of
many ways in which wealth transfer law facilitates donative intent by
accounting for changed or unanticipated circumstances. Indeed, much
of state wealth transfer law was either created to, or does in fact,
effectuate donative intent by filling gaps created by the donor's inability
to predict future events. 12 Other examples include the trust law

10. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992) (surveying numerous justifications for granting the owner of property the
freedom to determine its disposition at death).
11. Under section 2-605 of the Uniform Probate Code (the antilapse provision), if the
predeceased beneficiary were a grandparent or lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator,
then the devise would pass to the beneficiary's issue; otherwise, the devise to the predeceased
beneficiary would lapse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 261 (Supp.
2013); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 299 (Supp. 2013) (corresponding
rule applicable to interests in trust).
12. See generally Hirsch, supra note 6 (discussing current legal means available to honor
donor intent in light of changed circumstances and proposing a comprehensive alternative).
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modification doctrines; 13 powers of appointment;1 4 the repose of
discretion in a trustee; 15 doctrines of ademption, accession, satisfaction,
and abatement; 16 rules governing pretermitted spouses and children;1 7
the requirement of testamentary capacity;1 8 and the slayer rule.19
One may understand another inheritance rule, a beneficiary's
right of disclaimer, as a method of implementing donative intent by
providing for changed circumstances. Disclaimer, the right to refuse a
donative transfer, in effect, allows the donee to pass the disclaimed
property to the next eligible beneficiary set forth in the donative
instrument or intestacy statute. 2 0 Although most beneficiaries typically
accept a gift or inheritance, in certain circumstances, the right to
disclaim may be appealing for estate planning purposes. For example,
if the next eligible taker is closely related to the original beneficiary,
then disclaimer could keep inherited assets within the family while
potentially yielding tax savings or protecting inherited assets from
collection by the disclaimant's creditors. 21 Because most donors want to

13. These doctrines permit courts to modify a trust instrument in light of changed or
unanticipated circumstances. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A., at
497-98 (Supp. 2006) (modification); § 412, 7C U.L.A., at 507 (Supp. 2006) (deviation); § 413, 7C
U.L.A., at 509 (Supp. 2006) (cy pres).
14. Powers of appointment account for unanticipated circumstances by delegating to the
donee of the power the decision of whether, when, and sometimes to whom to appoint the property.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

17.1 (2011) ("A

power of appointment is a power that enables the donee of the power to designate recipients of
beneficial ownership interests in or powers of appointment over the appointive property.").
15. Powers of appointment and the repose of discretion in a trustee allow the donor to
postpone and delegate decisions regarding the selection of the beneficiary and timing and size of a
transfer, thus relieving the donor of the impractical task of predicting future events.
16. These doctrines account for changes in the composition of property that comprises the
testator's estate. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 261 (Supp. 2013)
(accession); § 2-606, 8 U.L.A pt. I, at 262 (Supp. 2013) (ademption); § 2-609, 8 U.L.A pt. I, at 267
(Supp. 2013) (satisfaction); § 3-902, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 347 (Supp. 2013) (abatement).
17. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301 to -302, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 192, 194 (Supp. 2013).
18. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501, 8 U.L.A pt. I, at 205 (Supp. 2013) ("An individual 18 or
more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will."). The requirement of testamentary
capacity accounts for the possibility that the testator might suffer from diminished cognitive
capacity in the future, thus preserving the plan of disposition memorialized when the testator
retained her mental faculties.
19. Section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code precludes the decedent's slayer from
inheritance if the killing was intentional. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 264-65
(Supp. 2013). This rule accounts for changed circumstance (the decedent's death by homicide) by
applying a presumption that the decedent would not want the slayer to inherit from the slain.
20. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-1101 to -1117, 8A U.L.A., at 159-89 (Supp. 2013)
(establishing general legal parameters for disclaiming property interests through a variety of
instruments including wills and nontestamentary instruments).
21. Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers: How States Are Modifying the Uniform Disclaimer
of PropertyInterests Act, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 325, 326 (2011):
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achieve efficient estate planning and protect their estates from
collection by tax authorities and creditors, we presume a donor with full
knowledge of the relevant circumstances at death would approve of or,
more likely, prefer the beneficiary's decision to disclaim rather than
take. 22 Had the donor known of circumstances causing the original
beneficiary to disclaim, the donor presumably would have skipped the
original beneficiary altogether in favor of the next eligible beneficiary. 23
Thus, while the original beneficiary holds the right to disclaim,
disclaimer arguably implements the donor's probable intent in light of
unanticipated circumstances extant at the time of transfer.
III. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF DONATIVE INTENT AND UNANTICIPATED
CIRCUMSTANCES TO FEDERAL DISCLAIMER LAW

Professor Hirsch's contribution to this Symposium, "Disclaimers
and Federalism," identifies three settings in which federal law displaces
or intersects with state law disclaimer rights: (1) federal claims, (2)
employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, and (3) bankruptcy
proceedings. The balance of this Comment examines how the principle
stated above-that wealth transfer law effectuates donative intent by
responding to circumstances unanticipated by the donor-would
facilitate a transparent and principled analysis of the competing
interests at stake in these three settings.

A. Federal Claims
Professor Hirsch first examines whether an intestate heir with
outstanding federal claims, such as federal tax or Medicaid liens, can
disclaim an inheritance to avoid subjecting the inherited property to
federal collection. This question implicates two competing interests: the
federal government's power to collect on unpaid claims and the

Those beneficiaries who are so poor that they have become insolvent and anticipate
bankruptcy may seek to disclaim to preserve an inheritance from creditors' claims,
while still keeping the inheritance within the family. Alternatively, those beneficiaries
who are so rich that they can do without an inheritance may prefer that it go instead to
family members of the next generation who occupy a lower income tax bracket,
sometimes avoiding transfer taxes in the bargain.
22. On the other hand, the beneficiary's decision not to disclaim may be contrary to the
donor's presumed interest in some cases. For example, an insolvent beneficiary might not disclaim
if the next to take is not a close relative. From the insolvent beneficiary's perspective, it would be
better to retain the inheritance to repay creditors than allow it to pass to an unrelated third party.
But from the donor's perspective, it would have been preferable for the next beneficiary to take
rather than allow creditors to collect from the inherited property.
23. This is, perhaps, not true in all cases. For example, the donor might not favor
disclaimer if the original beneficiary owed child support. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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decedent's interest in protecting her estate from an heir's outstanding
obligations owed to the federal government.
In Drye v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
unanimously that state law disclaimer rights interfere with, and are
therefore preempted by, the federal government's right to satisfy a tax
lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, which attaches to all "rights to property"
belonging to the taxpayer. 24 At issue was whether the right to disclaim
an intestate inheritance represented a valuable, taxable property
interest belonging to the tax-delinquent heir. The heir argued that the
right to disclaim was an inseparable attribute of inherited property and
that, because he received nothing from the intestate estate, the right to
refuse an inheritance had no value. The IRS countered that the right to
disclaim conferred upon the heir a right to channel the inheritance to
the next available taker and that such right had value equal to the
inherited property. 25 The Court agreed with the IRS and held that the
disclaimer represented a valuable right to property that was not exempt
from the federal tax levy. Further, because the disclaimant could
ascertain the next eligible taker before deciding whether to disclaim, 26
he had exercised sufficient dominion and control over the intestate
estate to treat him as holding a right to the inherited property. 27
Hirsch finds the Court's analysis unsatisfying in at least two
respects. First, determining whether the right to disclaim is a property
attribute or, in effect, a preemptable state law exemption from a federal
levy fails to yield helpful answers because the right to disclaim shares
elements of both characterizations. On the one hand, "a right to decline
gratuitous transfers of property[] represents a structural characteristic
of property," suggesting that federal law should not interfere with the
disclaimer because property interests arise under state law. 2 8 On the
other hand, the practical workings of a disclaimer function "no less
effectively than an express right of exemption from levy," implying that

24. 528 U.S. 49 (1999). Explaining the interplay between state and federal law, the Court
stated, "The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly read to look to state law for
delineation of the taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determination
whether those rights or interests constitute 'property' or 'rights to property' within the meaning of
§ 6321." Id. at 52.
25. Id. at 56-59.
26. The disclaimant's daughter was the next eligible taker. Upon receiving the disclaimed
inheritance, the daughter placed it in trust for the disclaimant's benefit. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 60-61.
28. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1889 (emphasis omitted). Hirsch opines that, as a policy matter,
deference to state law would prevent federal law from reconfiguring state-created property
interests in ways that could impose arbitrary tax liens on property owners who did not contribute
to the delinquency.
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the federal power to collect on tax liens should preempt state law
disclaimers. 29
Second, Professor Hirsch argues that the Court's observations
about the degree of control exercised by the disclaimant are inconsistent
with other applications of federal law in the disclaimer context. For
example, the federal gift tax applies to the transfer of property over
which a donor exercises dominion and control, but qualified disclaimers
are excluded from the gift tax because "the disclaimed interest in
property is treated as if it had never been transferred to the person
making the disclaimer. Instead, it is considered as passing directly from
the transferor of the property to the person entitled to receive the
property as a result of the disclaimer." 30 As Professor Hirsch asks,
"Why, then, does the disclaimant's degree of dominion applicable to the
collection of back taxes differ from the degree of dominion applicable to
the assessment of front taxes?" 31
I join in Professor Hirsch's critique and offer another. The
Court's focus on the beneficiary's right to disclaim and degree of control
misinterprets the functional purpose of disclaimer. If, as I contend, the
primary justification for disclaimer is to carry out the donor's probable
intent in light of unanticipated circumstances, then the disclaimant's
own conduct and rights should be irrelevant. Under the principle of
donative intent, the inquiry is reduced to whether federal law should
allow the donor to bypass a tax-delinquent beneficiary in her estate
plan. What if the decedent in Drye, who had started to prepare an
instrument disinheriting her tax-delinquent son entirely, had lived long
enough to execute it? More broadly, should federal law displace the
donor's right to disinherit an heir with outstanding tax liens? As
Professor Hirsch notes, the Court briefly discussed this point at oral
argument, but the opinion does not address it.3 2 Noting that the
decedent came "within a hair's breadth of effectuating the outcome she
would have preferred," Professor Hirsch opines that this focus on donor
intent "might have proven the most potent [argument] in [the
taxpayer's] arsenal, and he should have led with it."33

29. Id.
30. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(b) (as amended in 1997).
31.
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1893.
32. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg made the following passing comment to the
taxpayer's attorney: "I'm just curious about why the taxpayer, Mr. Drye being in this situation, he
didn't have his mother write a will leaving the estate to the daughter." The attorney stated that
the ninety-two-year-old decedent had an appointment to make a will on the date of her death.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (No. 98-1101), 1999 WL
1050103, at *14.
33. Hirsch, supranote 1, at 1894.
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Principles of donative intent and unanticipated circumstances
might have yielded a more satisfying analysis than the Court's inquiry
into the characterization of property rights and the beneficiary's
dominion and control. That is, if state disclaimer rights can be
understood as effectuating donative intent in cases where the donor
fails to anticipate an heir's insolvency, then preemption should turn on
whether federal tax law overrides the donor's right to have that intent
effectuated at all, regardless of whether the heir chooses to disclaim.
Under current law, the freedom of disposition holds that a donor
has an absolute right to disinherit insolvent or tax-delinquent heirs
(unless, unrelated to insolvency or tax delinquency, the heir is also the
donor's surviving spouse). 34 If, however, the federal interest in the
collection of outstanding tax liens were sufficiently great, then federal
law could impose a restriction on the donor's freedom of disposition by
precluding donors from disinheriting tax-delinquent heirs. 35 This
approach would treat donors who address the possibility of taxdelinquent heirs by disinheriting them similarly to donors who fail to
anticipate that possibility. Such an approach would, in effect, create a
neutral rule of forced succession for donors survived by tax-delinquent
heirs notwithstanding the adequacy or inadequacy of the donor's estate
plan. A federal limitation on the freedom of disposition in this area
would also further the interests of uniformity by treating tax liens alike
in all jurisdictions.

B. ERISA
Professor Hirsch next examines the state law right to disclaim
nonprobate transfers at death governed by ERISA. The interplay
between ERISA and state disclaimer law draws upon another
intersection between ERISA and state wealth transfer law providing for
unanticipated circumstances: revocation by operation of state law upon
divorce. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the United States Supreme Court held
that ERISA preempted a Washington state statute revoking, by
operation of law, nonprobate beneficiary designations in favor of a
former spouse. 36 The Court reasoned that deference to state law would
frustrate ERISA's goal of achieving national uniformity with regard to

34. In most states, a disinherited surviving spouse may elect against the decedent's estate.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 149-50 (Supp. 2013).
35. Alternatively, federal law could apply the state-law prohibition on collusive disclaimers.
As Hirsch explains, this would have allowed the government to unwind the disclaimer in Drye
because the disclaimant's daughter placed the inheritance in trust for the disclaimant's benefit.
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1894-95.

36

532 U.S. 141 (2001).
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the administration of employee benefits. 37 State statutes revoking
beneficiary designations in favor of a former spouse anticipate the
commonplace problem of a donor's failure to update a donative
instrument, such as a will or nonprobate death beneficiary designation,
upon divorce. 38 In Egelhoff, federal preemption required the employee
benefit plan administrator to abide solely by the terms of the ERISAgoverned plan documents, not the revocation-on-divorce statute,
thereby allowing the decedent's former spouse to claim the life
insurance and retirement benefits. Applying Egelhoffs rationale,
federal circuit courts have also held that ERISA preempts state law
disclaimer rights where an ERISA plan explicitly addresses the right to
disclaim. 39 But what about cases in which the ERISA plan is silent on
the question of disclaimer? Documenting the lack of governing
precedent, Professor Hirsch concludes that the answer remains
unclear. 4 0
Professor Hirsch observes that, while uniformity is typically
cited as the federal interest justifying ERISA preemption, the problems
associated with lack of uniformity are less acute with regard to
disclaimers.4 1 Proceeding on the assumption that ERISA may therefore
implicitly incorporate some law of disclaimer, Hirsch then turns to
whether disclaimer law in the ERISA context should come from existing
state law or through development of federal common law. Both
alternatives tend to yield inconsistent outcomes: "recourse to state
disclaimer law would cause indistinguishable plans to become subject
to different rules of disclaimer," but "introducing a federal law for
qualified pension plans means that different forms of property will come
under separate rules of disclaimer." 42 The formidably slow task of
developing a federal common law of ERISA disclaimer suggests that
incorporating features of state disclaimer law would be the simpler
approach. Professor Hirsch correctly notes that a slow and meandering
development of federal common law in this area would almost surely
(and undesirably) lead to widespread uncertainty given the absence of
federal ERISA disclaimer law.

37. Id. at 151.
38. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 330-32 (Supp. 2013)
(establishing a default rule which, upon divorce or annulment, revokes any revocable disposition
of property to a former spouse stipulated in any governing instrument, cancels any conference of
power of appointment, and negates any nomination as a fiduciary).
39. Nickel v. Estate of Estes, 122 F.3d 294, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1997).
40. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1899.
41. Id. at 1902-03.
42. Id. at 1907.
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Principles of donative intent and unanticipated circumstances
are consistent with the legislative purposes of ERISA, which seek to
safeguard the management and distribution of employee retirement
benefits. 43 Plan participants have an interest in ensuring that their
retirement assets are properly distributed during life and in accordance
with their donative intent at death. ERISA intricately regulates the
administration and distribution of retirement assets during the
employee's life, but as Professor Hirsch observes, it lacks a
comprehensive framework regulating the disposition of covered assets
at death. Development of that framework at the federal level, whether
by statute, regulation, or judicial decision, would benefit from
consideration of state rules effectuating the donor's intent in the face of
unanticipated circumstances.
For example, suppose an intestate decedent leaves behind an
ERISA-governed life insurance policy naming her only son as the sole
death beneficiary. The decedent's son is insolvent, has four children
(three by his current spouse, one by a former spouse), and owes child
support exceeding the death benefit to his former spouse. The son
disclaims in an attempt to pass the insurance proceeds through the
decedent's probate estate to the four grandchildren in equal shares,
thereby channeling three quarters of the proceeds into his household
free of child support liability. Under state law, distribution would
depend on whether the decedent's jurisdiction recognizes an insolvent
disclaimer exception for child support. In a jurisdiction with such an
exception, the disclaimed interest would be subject to the child support
claim and the entire amount would pass to the former spouse in
satisfaction of that claim; in a jurisdiction without this exception, the
disclaimed interest would pass to the decedent's four grandchildren in
equal shares. Should ERISA, which is silent on the issue, apply or
displace state disclaimer law in this setting?
Principles of donative intent and unanticipated circumstances
provide useful guidance. States vary on whether an insolvent
beneficiary's right to disclaim is effective against an exception for
outstanding child support claims; a few states recognize an exception,
but most do not.4 4 Applying principles of donative intent, one could
understand state law disclaimer exceptions for child support claims as
implementing the donor's probable intent in light of unanticipated

43.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (stating that the primary policy goals of ERISA are to protect
interstate commerce, the federal taxing power, and the beneficiaries of employee benefit plans).
44. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1910. For jurisdictions recognizing the exception, see ALASKA
STAT. § 13.70.110(f)(1) (2013); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-17.5-8-2.5, 32-17.5-8-6 (West 2014); TEx. EST.
CODE ANN. § 122.107(a) (West 2013).
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circumstances concerning the beneficiary's family.4 5 That is, had the
donor known of the beneficiary's unpaid child support claims, would the
donor have wanted the beneficiary to disclaim? Arguably, states
recognizing an exception give effect to the donor's presumed intent to
favor the child support claimant over the next eligible taker.4 6 By
contrast, states that do not recognize an exception effectuate the donor's
intent to favor the next eligible taker over the insolvent disclaimant's
children and former spouse with unpaid support claims.
This analysis helps to distill the competing interests at stake.
On the one hand, ERISA's concern for uniformity serves the interests
of plan custodians in achieving efficient administration of employee
retirement benefits.4 7 On the other hand, state disclaimer law serves
the interests of plan participants by carrying out state law
presumptions about their probable intent in light of unanticipated
circumstances. Upon balancing these interests, one might decide that
Congress's concern for uniformity and efficient plan administration
must yield if ERISA's primary legislative purpose is ensuring the
distribution of retirement benefits in accordance with the plan
participant's intent.

C. Bankruptcy Proceedings
Professor Hirsch last examines whether bankruptcy law
recognizes a state law disclaimer filed by an insolvent debtor. The
Bankruptcy Code provides that inherited property disclaimed by the
debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding is returned to the bankruptcy
estate available to creditors.4 8 However, state law generally governs
disclaimers that occur before the debtor files for bankruptcy, so the
bankruptcy estate's inclusion of property disclaimed before filing of the
bankruptcy petition turns on whether the state in which the decedent
45. Alternatively, child support exceptions could also be understood as grounded in the
state's public policy protecting children, but a donor could easily avoid the state's public policy by
disinheriting beneficiaries with outstanding child support claims.
46. This approach is consistent with similar presumptions underlying antilapse rules
discussed above-that the interest of a predeceased beneficiary related to the donor by blood
should pass to the beneficiary's own children who are also blood relations of the donor. Thus, the
law presumes the testator intended the lapsed share to pass to the predeceased beneficiary's own
children rather than the next eligible taker. See Hirsch, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
47. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) ("An employer that makes a
commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations . . .. The most
efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which
provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.").
48. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5). Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, this rule applies to
inheritances received within the first 180 days after the petition. Id. Under Chapters 12 and 13,
this rule applies to any inheritance received during the proceeding. §§ 1207(a)(1), 1306(a)(1).
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was domiciled at death permits insolvent disclaimers. 4 9 Only a minority
of states prohibit insolvent disclaimers, so in most states the timing of
the debtor's disclaimer (before or after the bankruptcy petition)
determines whether bankruptcy law recognizes the disclaimer.5 0 In
states that permit insolvent disclaimers, the debtor can shield inherited
property from creditor collection by filing a disclaimer before filing for
bankruptcy.5 1
With regard to prepetition disclaimers, Professor Hirsch
maintains that the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of insolvent
disclaimers is unprincipled because it permits strategic timing of
disclaimers to avoid creditor claims in the majority of states that allow
insolvent disclaimers; this tenuous position, he contends, is the result
of Congressional oversight, not deliberate policy. 52 With regard to
postpetition disclaimers, Professor Hirsch explains that the relevant
statutory provision, Bankruptcy Code Section 54 1(a), does not explicitly
address disclaimers and its textual history does not support an
inference that Congress intended it to foreclose postpetition
disclaimers. 53 Hirsch argues that "lawmakers need to coordinate
sections 548 [prepetition disclaimers] and 541(a)(5) [postpetition
disclaimers] so that they operate seamlessly, observing either state law
or a federal rule of insolvent disclaimer."5 4
A federalized principle of donative intent and unanticipated
circumstances would, again, provide guidance. Most donors presumably
prefer to avoid subjecting their estates to creditor claims asserted
against the beneficiary, so the beneficiary's insolvency, if anticipated ex
ante, would cause the donor to protect those assets from creditor
collection or select a different beneficiary. The most common asset
protection technique for this purpose is the discretionary spendthrift
trust, which renders trust assets immune to most of the beneficiary's
creditors.55 Bankruptcy law recognizes third party discretionary
spendthrift trusts that are otherwise valid under state law, thus

49. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1910.
50. Id.
51.
Of course, in the inheritance context, the donor would also have to die first. Might this
rule create an incentive for a depraved debtor in financial distress to hasten the donor's death?
Probably not. Presumably the donor, if approached by the debtor, would simply agree to amend
her estate plan.
52.
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1916-17.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1920.
55. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 502-503 (2000), 7C U.L.A., at 523-25 (Supp. 2006) (modification).
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precluding creditors of the beneficiary from collecting on property held
in trust.5 6
Under the principle of donative intent, if bankruptcy law
recognizes the freedom of disposition for donors who anticipate the
beneficiary's insolvency by establishing a discretionary spendthrift
trust, then it should permit insolvent disclaimers to recognize the same
freedom of disposition for donors who fail to anticipate the beneficiary's
insolvency. Recognition of insolvent disclaimers, to the extent
permitted by state law, would place the donor who fails to anticipate
the beneficiary's potential insolvency in a more comparable position to
the donor who anticipates the circumstance. Deference to state law
would leave intact state policies regarding insolvent disclaimers and
restore consistency between the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
insolvent disclaimers and discretionary spendthrift trusts.
On the other hand, if a federal interest mandated that creditor
rights override the donor's interest in protecting gifted assets from
claims against the beneficiary, then bankruptcy law should foreclose
both insolvent disclaimers and discretionary spendthrift trusts.
Further, if lawmakers deemed creditor rights of paramount concern,
federal law could also impose a restriction on the donor's freedom to
transfer property to an insolvent beneficiary. Either way, consideration
of principles of donative intent and unanticipated circumstances would
permit a more transparent and principled analysis of the treatment of
insolvent disclaimers under federal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federalization of wealth transfer law creates potential for
harmful disruptions to settled and well-considered substantive state
law policies governing inheritance, property succession, and wealth
transfer. As federal actors increasingly operate in this area, they might
minimize disruptions by due consideration of the most important
guiding principle of state wealth transfer law-that the law facilitates
donative intent by responding to circumstances unanticipated by the
donor. This principle may not always succeed in harmonizing state and
federal interests in this area, but it would at least permit a more
principled and transparent evaluation of those interests.

56.

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012).

